The topic of this paper is the parliamentary obstacles to the development of national economy in Iran (1989-2005). After problem statement and proving the problematic aspect of it, we deal with a theoretical solution through constructing a theoretical apparatus which is the result of applying the concepts of Leftwich's theory, theory of rentier state and Katouzian's theory presented in the framework of structural public choice theory. Then the data for each of concepts related to content analysis and historical analysis are collected and referred by narrative analysis. The results show that the strategic action of parliament members as rational actors takes place in a strategic context of rentier state, and the two round majority-based election system inclines towards satisfying immediate demands of the electorate. The policies resulted from this kind of action incline towards satisfying the same demands that play a negative role in development of national economy
Dinparast, F., & Sa'ee, A. (2014). Parliamentary Obstacles to Development of National Economy in Iran (1989-2005). Research Letter of Political Science, 9(4), 23-72.
MLA
Faez Dinparast; Ali Sa'ee. "Parliamentary Obstacles to Development of National Economy in Iran (1989-2005)". Research Letter of Political Science, 9, 4, 2014, 23-72.
HARVARD
Dinparast, F., Sa'ee, A. (2014). 'Parliamentary Obstacles to Development of National Economy in Iran (1989-2005)', Research Letter of Political Science, 9(4), pp. 23-72.
VANCOUVER
Dinparast, F., Sa'ee, A. Parliamentary Obstacles to Development of National Economy in Iran (1989-2005). Research Letter of Political Science, 2014; 9(4): 23-72.
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